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Relational happiness through recognition and redistribution: Emotion and inequality 
 
Abstract 
This paper develops a model of relational happiness that challenges popular individualised definitions 
and emphasises how it can enhance the sociological analysis of inequality. Many studies of happiness 
suggest that social inequalities are closely associated with distributions of happiness at the national 
level, but happiness research continues to favour individual-level analyses. Limited attention has been 
given to the intersubjective aspects of happiness and the correlations between it and higher social 
equality. Conversely, key theoretical debates about inequalities, such as Axel Honneth and Nancy 
Fraser’s exchanges, have only indirectly touched on happiness. A relational approach to happiness is 
not new, but what we offer is a new combination of a relational understanding of happiness as an 
intersubjectively, culturally experienced complex of emotions with discussions about recognition of 
marginalized groups and redistribution of material resources. This combined approach can further 
debates about understanding and remedying social inequalities. We argue that theories and 
measurements of happiness must consider how it is achieved collectively through working at mutual 
respect as well as greater material equality. 
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Introduction 
There are discrepancies in cultural narratives about happiness as an individual pursuit in modernity, 
especially in the context of continuing inequalities. This complicates attempts to theorise and measure 
happiness, especially because many studies use inconsistent definitions of terms like ‘happiness’, 
‘wellbeing’ or ‘satisfaction’ (Author B, 2016; Davies, 2015; Oishi et al., 2013; Wierzbicka, 2009). 
Yet happiness studies generally focus on these feelings as individual experiences. While experinces of 
happiness may occur within the individual, we are interested in how experiences of happiness and 
well-being are shaped by socio-cultural context in ways that are relational rather than purely personal 
(Ahmed, 2007; Ahuvia, et al., 2015; Bartram, 2012: 645; White, 2017). This approach to happiness 
draws upon relational sociology, which sees society not as the site ‘where relations happen, it is 
relations’ (Donati, 2011: xv). To slightly adjust Nick Crossley’s (2010: 50) words, we aim to examine 
how the selﬁsh pursuit of individual happiness can be less proﬁtable to interdependent actors than a 
more cooperative strategy. In doing this we conceptualise happiness as a complex of emotions 
(Burkitt, 2014: 14-15), extending Burkitt’s definition to mean not just complex as in complicated and 
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in made up of different experiences, but as a set of related emotions. With happiness these include 
wellbeing, satisfaction and contentment, but also enjoyment, fulfilment and other feelings of pleasure. 
Other emotions such as trust, envy and shame may also frame un/happiness. We define emotion as ‘a 
relatively non-specific umbrella term’ (Von Scheve, 2017: 41) covering feelings and affects that surge 
and are articulated, in both discursive, embodied and other material ways, between humans, non-
humans and objects1. We propose that it is not always possible to entirely disentangle distinct 
emotions nor to locate them within individuals (Author, 2010). The impact of relations to others on 
individuals’ emotions and actions is evident to many scholars (Crossley, 2010: 50; Von Scheve, 
2017), but often neglected in studies of happiness. In our relational approach, happiness stands for a 
culturally-varying complex of emotions, oriented around taking pleasure in life (Veenhoven, 2010). 
These emotions are individually felt but also intersubjectively achieved. 
 
A relational approach to happiness can explain findings that greater equality is a better predictor of 
self-reported happiness than greater wealth (Diener, Tay and Oishi, 2013; Easterlin and Angelescu, 
2009; Oishi and Kesebir, 2015; White 2017). In doing this, it is necessary to acknowledge the 
significance of collectively authenticated selfhood, or feeling recognized by others, in the experience 
of happiness. Rather than categorical correlations with happiness (such as education, marital status, or 
employment), this paper will explore self-reported happiness data as powerfully influenced by 
recognition from others, or its lack, within the context of unequal distributions of material wealth. 
Thus we begin with a criticism of happiness studies' emphasis on conceptions of happiness as 
individually experienced and related to national wealth. This emphasis limits attention to how 
inequality impacts on more social forms of wellbeing that are achieved in interaction with others and 
include more sustained, if background emotions (Barbalet, 1998: 29, 59-61), accompanied by more 
fleeting feelings of happiness. To address these shortcomings we then turn to debates around 
redistribution or recognition as remedies for social inequalities. Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser's 
writings provide promising possibilities, but these theories only indirectly consider happiness. We 
argue that their accounts of inequalities can be usefully furthered by seeing happiness as a complex of 
interactively achieved emotions. In pursuing this relational approach we draw attention to the 
importance of recognition of marginalized groups in explaining the links between happiness and 
inequality.  By promoting understandings of happiness that embed it within social relations and 
examine it as a complex cluster of emotions, we can improve the theorizing and measuring of it. We, 
therefore, argue that happiness is a relational achievement, contingent on efforts to respect others and 
to redistribute material and emotional goods. 
 
 
Happiness Studies and the need for understanding happiness as complex 
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Happiness tends to be conceptualised in oversimplified and individualised ways as a distinct emotion 
that is contained within a person. Quantitative happiness studies generally rely on the Subjective 
Well-being Test (SWB) that asks respondents to rank their happiness on a scale from one to ten, 
without directly asserting what the researchers mean by happiness or well-being, nor articulating how 
it might relate to other emotions (Diener, 2000). Yet, Oishi et al. (2013) argue that the meaning of 
happiness has changed in the last 200 years from having a basis in good fortune and luck to describing 
the individual’s pursuit of happiness against all odds. Popular happiness literature reaffirms this shift 
by offering highly individualised solutions to the problem of happiness. Books like The 100 Simple 
Secrets of Happy People (Niven, 2006) focus on personal happiness ‘skills’ like finding a hobby or 
thinking about the future and not dwelling on the past. Positive psychology also offers individual-
focused strategies that tend to overlook the seriousness of structural inequalities and the complexity of 
cultural meanings. In Laura Hyman’s interviews about what happiness means to people in the UK, a 
common response was that it is elusive and difficult to define, followed by somewhat individualised 
clichés from simply ‘choosing to be happy’ to forms of biological determinism (2014: 33). Ahuvia et 
al. (2015) propose a two-part model for categorising these competing dialogues by identifying 
‘change the world’ and ‘change your mind’ approaches to being happy. While much of the discussion 
in happiness discourse focuses on the latter, we argue that evidence indicates the former is 
significantly more effective (Easterlin, 2003; Cieslik, 2015. Happiness consists of both fleeting 
feelings and more ongoing, sometimes shared, experiences of satisfaction, wellbeing or contentment 
(Cieslik, 2015: 427). Yet the separation between individual and relational happiness in lived 
experience may be noticably less clear to the subject, than it is to the researcher. Happiness describes 
foregrounded emotional experiences, but concepts like well-being and contentment are likely to 
involve background emotions that are ‘assumed, taken for granted, and unacknowledged’ (Barbalet, 
1998: 59) – at least until an individual is asked to complete a happiness survey. Overall, individual 
narratives of happiness as a clear personal goal prevail in late modern Western cultures and happiness 
studies often fails to challenge them and ask to what extent they capture the complex range of 
emotions around feeling happy and feeling that all is well. This confuses analysis of the impact of 
forms of material inequality on happiness and limits our sociological understanding of the conditions 
necessary for flourishing.  
 
The central problem is that the individualised view of happiness (including backgrounded feelings of 
wellbeing) is inadequate to the task of explaining how happiness and inequality are connected. 
Quantitative happiness research frequently shows that individual happiness is heavily influenced by 
differences in living conditions (specifically economic and social inequality), yet evidence suggests 
that increased individual wealth is unlikely to raise happiness once basic needs have been met (Barker 
and Martin, 2012). Easterlin famously argued that as a nation gets richer the percentage of individuals 
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considering themselves ‘very happy’ either declines or experiences no change (Easterlin, 2003; Lane, 
2000). Yet attempts to raise happiness levels through improved living conditions have arguably aimed 
to lift national GDP as a whole rather than addressing growing economic inequalities within nations. 
This ignores findings showing that self-reported happiness is generally higher in countries with 
greater political, economic and social equality (Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Helliwell et al., 2015, 2017; 
Lane, 2000). While empirical work that measures political and social inequalities is inherently 
challenging to produce, there is extensive material that contrasts ecnomic inequality – generally based 
on GDP – and well-being. Oishi and Kesebir (2015) provide an important alternative by reconfiguring 
Easterlin’s study – which links economic growth with static self-reported happiness – and showing 
that the growth or decline of income inequality, rather than overall shifts in GDP, was consistently 
linked to the percentage of a society reporting to be ‘very happy’. Economic growth tends to occur 
within specific market sectors and so periods of substantial growth among a minority of citizens have 
little bearing on the happiness of the society as a whole (Oishi and Kesebir, 2015: 1632). We cannot 
know exactly what the respondents meant by ‘very happy’, but the complex emotional meanings and 
experiences respondents attached to happiness seem more related to fairness, equality, relation to 
others and recognition, than to the individual or collective pursuit of wealth. The World Values 
Survey supports claims that the more equal a society the more equally distributed some feeling of 
happiness is amongst its citizens (Delhey and Kohler, 2012), albeit this may range from brief 
moments of individual or shared joy to ongoing interactive experience of wellbeing. This finding is 
especially clear when wellbeing and inequality are compared within a nation over a period of time 
(Schröder 2018), although findings are more varied in urban/rural (Cheung 2015) and 
developing/developed national comparisons (Kelley & Evans (2017). Motivations for change and 
change itself can arise from noting the societal as well as individual benefits of more equal 
distributions of wealth (Fiszbein et al., 2014; Thin, 2012; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). However, 
links to a variety of meanings and other emotions closely associated with happiness are only dimly 
seen. 
 
Other emotions such as trust appear important in understanding the connections between happiness 
and inequality. Authors of the World Happiness Report 2015 (Helliwell et al., 2015) argue that low 
levels of inequality are linked to high levels of trust, and the combination of these conditions is 
consistently found among the world’s happiest nations: Denmark, Norway and Iceland. Meanwhile, 
the United States ranks only eighteenth in the world happiness rankings despite having the highest 
overall GDP (Helliwell, 2018). A decline in trust may impact on self-reported happiness (Lane, 2000). 
Trust seems to lessen in countries where inequalities are more pronounced but further analysis is 
needed to avoid emphasizing superficial links between national wealth and individual happiness. This 
may require a better understanding of how ‘actors will only learn to trust in environments where 
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others practise trust and prove trustworthy’ (Crossley, 2010: 67). Happiness does not occur in 
isolation from other emotions or other people, it is primarily a complex, and relational phenomenon. 
 
A sociological understanding of how emotions and inequalities are entangled is enhanced by seeing 
happiness as part of a complex of emotions, made up of complicated and various experiences (Burkitt, 
2014: 14-15) and of interrelated, inter-relational emotions. Yet research aiming to provide useful 
strategies for maximising happiness typically underreports the social and cultural expectations and 
understandings that encourage or impede attempts at happiness. The salience of cultural meanings and 
the importance of others in determining happiness is noted by some scholars (Bartram, 2012: 649-50; 
Thin, 2012; White, 2017). German and South African participants in Pflug’s (2009) study, for 
instance, mention community and social bonds before positive affect. And analysis of the tension 
between social and individual forms of happiness can be found (Ahuvia et al., 2015; Author, 2016). 
However, appreciating happiness as a complex, interactional achievement requires exploring it as 
linked to historically and culturally varying emotional norms and practices (cf. Elias, 2001; Pflug, 
2009). For example, North Americans appear typically more optimistic and individualistic in pursuing 
happiness (Oishi et al., 2013; Pflug, 2009), while the French seem to be more pessimistic (Ostroot and 
Snyder, 1985). These norms reflect not only how people feel about their lives, but also how others 
might perceive them. Individuals are likely to appraise their life positively if others also judge it so 
(Veenhoven, 2008: 47) and satisfaction and happiness are thus adjudged by comparing oneself to 
others (Heath, 1976; Kahneman, 2003). However, this might lead us to assume that those with wealth 
will feel happy. While this is often the case within nations (e.g. the rich are almost always happier 
than the poor), empirical links between wealth and happiness at the national level are absent in both 
rich and poor nations (Easterlin, 2010). Furthermore, the pursuit of greater individual wealth, among 
those who are already financially well off, has a negligible impact on actual self-reported happiness 
(Barker and Martin, 2012). Social inequalities may mean, for example, that fear of crime or fear of 
revolutionary rebellion (Barbalet, 2001: 149-169) can mar even the wealthy’s enjoyment of aspects of 
social life by limiting such things as freedom of movement2 and freedom from fear.  Further research 
is needed on how other emotions such as envy and anger amongst the poor (Patulny, 2015) might be 
experienced in relation to the rich3Some evidence indicates that Americans at least, are happier if 
their near neighbours are rich but the point is that richer neighbourhoods advantage everyone in them, 
while poorer neighbourhoods reduce happiness for all living there (Firebaugh and Schroeder, 2009). 
A more relational view of happiness can explain how the personal or collective happiness of the rich 
might be spoiled by other feelings experienced in relation to the poor such as guilt, shame and fear. 
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As we see, happiness occurs in relation to other emotions but also within the context of particular 
social relations (both structural and interpersonal). This includes relations with other agents such as 
non-humans, natural environments and objects.  Such an analysis must consider how people script 
emotional scenarios within these relations, but also bring and alter emotional dispositions developed 
within their biography. Experiences are interactive, not individual, and relations with other agents are 
changing patterned figurations involving power (Elias, 2000[1939]). Thus, accounts of happiness and 
wellbeing need to understand them as historical and culturally specific sets of social meanings, 
feelings and practices, instead of as properties of individuals. 
 
Thus, better articulation of the complexity and relationality of happiness is of significant value for a 
sociological understanding of inequalities in the twenty-first century. More explicit discussion of this 
improved articulation builds on theoretical debates around redistribution of resources versus 
recognition of persons, especially the debate between Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser. The aim is to 
more fully express the intersubjective and emotional character of recognition and how its lack 
underlies ‘unhappiness’, within contexts of maldistribution. This is significant in revealing that a 
relational approach to emotions can go beyond analyzing the micro level and provide explanatory 
power for making sense of structural inequalities.  
 
Connecting Happiness, Equality and Recognition  
Honneth’s work on mutual recognition as intersubjective phenomena provides a platform for using a 
relational approach to happiness that furthers our understanding of inequalities.  He challenges 
existing debates on inequality by considering the intersubjective and relational sources of inequality. 
By reimagining freedom as socially sourced rather than individually pursued or structurally 
guaranteed, debates about freedom and inequality are brought together in productive and original 
ways (Honneth, 2014a; 2014b). Building on Mead’s (1962) intersubjective theory of selfhood and the 
notion of ‘ethical life’ from Hegel’s Jena period, Honneth (1995) utilises the normative dimensions of 
critical theory to establish a socially grounded understanding of happiness and the good life achieved 
through democratic social freedoms. By treating interaction as a necessary condition for the self, 
Honneth adopts Hegelian interpretations of autonomy and happiness as requiring, rather than hindered 
by relationships. In Hegel’s (1962: 123) Philosophy of Right autonomy and happiness are not found in 
escaping the responsibilities and duties of social relationships, rather they are made possible through 
specific kinds of relationships. In pursuing happiness, solutions cannot be found in a departure from 
social bonds through individualisation. Where happiness is absent from a set of social relationships 
this calls for new and different kinds of relationships rather than an abandonment of relational 
emotional experiences. For Honneth, recognition enables one’s selfhood to develop in meaningful 
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ways through collective participation, which he terms mutual self-realisation (Honneth, 1995). 
Recognition is, therefore, the missing dimension of citizenship, participatory democracy and civil 
rights, as all of these priorities are hollow concepts without the simple practice of mutual respect and 
recognition. Honneth traces a lack of recognition to the growth in contemporary civil rights, and 
growing individualism but also points to modernity's impact on feelings like humiliation, and other 
emotional experiences such as respect or dignity (2004). Under these conditions, recognition is not 
simply a matter of happiness (as joy or pleasure), it necessarily involves feelings of legitimacy, of 
being worthy of rights and political representation in the eyes of others. Honneth captures this in 
Hegel’s notion of being “with oneself in the other” and in doing so brings ideas of friendship, love 
and happiness into debates about equality and freedom (Honneth, 2014a: 44). This intersubjective 
approach notes that individuals need to feel that recognition is genuinely given by others, it cannot be 
guaranteed by the legal protection of rights. Legal findings against systematic racism or for same-sex 
marriage, will not guarantee a culture of respect or recognition. The focus in his analysis constantly 
shifts between the recognition of individuals and of marginalised social groups and the impact on 
feelings about the self. While Honneth’s work on recognition is typically referenced in debates about 
justice, inequality and identity, our reading places this work as an important contribution to studies of 
happiness and the good life.  The concept of happiness is rarely mentioned directly in recognition 
debates, however, Honneth’s emphasis on feelings of self-worth sees him draw connections between 
individualised and social forms of happiness. 
 
Honneth (2004) points to increasing pressure to find self-realisation individually rather than 
collaboratively and that this has led to a decline in meaningful forms of selfhood and therefore, 
happiness. In ‘Organized Self-Realization’ (2004) Honneth draws from Simmel in order to reconsider 
the place of two dominant themes in the last century of sociological thought; rationalisation (Weber) 
and individualisation (Durkheim). Simmel’s emphasis on exchange between individuals allows room 
for a review of individualisation processes that show the contradictions involved in growing 
interdependency through diminishing social bonds. Inwardly focused forms of personal development 
leave little time for the recognition of others, and so a community of successful and unique 
individuals are left feeling incomplete without positive affirmation from others. More recently, 
Honneth’s Freedom’s Right (2014) clarifies his position on achieving social freedom through mutual 
self-realisation by using a Hegelian understanding of self and social institutions. It would be a mistake 
to equate freedom with happiness as is typical in traditional liberal ideologies, but Honneth’s proposal 
allows for these terms to be associated in more relational and collective ways through the notion of 
ethical life. He brings together two decades’ worth of work on recognition and social freedom into a 
more cohesive and definitive statement on the need for intersubjective Hegelian perspectives in 
debates on inequality. Freedom’s Right continues to use the basis of ‘ethical life’ in place of the good 
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life where he highlights how both Hegel and Marx consider freedom to be possible when individual 
actions are ‘confirmed by other subjects whose reciprocal action enables them to pursue their own 
aims’ (2014a: 52). 
 
Nancy Fraser's (2001) response to Honneth further aids a relational understanding of happiness and 
inequality because she considers the redistribution of material resources as inseperable from the goal 
of mutual recognition (2003). Pursuing the ideal of recognition risks addressing the cultural lack of 
respect, while leaving those who are seriously disadvantaged by socio-economic polarisation in 
shared misery. Meanwhile, the structural inequalities of economic disadvantage can serve to reinforce 
hierarchies that threaten recognition. Fraser does not reject the importance of recognition, rather she 
claims that too much attention is given to its ideals of social democracy without addressing tangible 
material inequalities. In the case of gender inequality, Fraser has argued that matters of economic and 
social injustice have been disconnected following the successes of second wave feminism (2013: 
211). In an interview from 2004, Fraser explains that “Instead of arriving at a broader, richer 
paradigm that could encompass both redistribution and recognition, we seem to have traded one 
truncated paradigm for another—a truncated economism for a truncated culturalism.” (2004: 112).  
 
While Fraser is sometimes critiqued for disregarding ‘identity politics’ in favour of material 
inequalities, although this view is  not supported by her writings (Fraser, 2008). The mislabeling of 
Fraser’s views can arguably be traced back to her distinction between rights and ethics. In 
‘Recognition without Ethics?', Fraser (2001) argues that questions of justice have been separated from 
questions of the good – or in Honneth’s terminology, the ethical – life as the former pertains primarily 
to what is right, while the latter addresses what is good or preferable. Is the denial of mutual 
recognition a matter of right and wrong, or simply a matter of better and worse? Or in other words, is 
the systematic denial of access to the good life through misrecognition an injustice or simply an 
unfortunate situation. For Fraser, this kind of misrecognition is an injustice of equal severetity to legal 
or economic discrimination.  This analysis of how ‘good' and ‘happy' relate can be unpacked by 
considering tensions between Kantian and Hegelian perspectives. In the Kantian tradition, the 
significance of happiness and the good life can be downplayed as ideals that are outside of moral 
principles of justice. However the denial of meaningful selfhood through misrecognition is more than 
an inconvenience. Therefore, normative critical theory  needs to address questions of the good life as 
a matter of justice rather than simply a speculative ideal based on individual enjoyment. This position 
can be found both in Fraser's work on redistribution and Honneth's later work on freedom (2014a). 
Recognition is, therefore, a necessary human right if a democratic nation of autonomous citizens is to 
exist (Kompridis, 2013)4, but it is difficult to enforce such a right if recognition is perceived in terms 
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of moral preferences rather than strict rights (Terpe and Paierl, 2010). Unhappiness appears 
complexly related to economic polarisation and to the devaluing of others (Sayer 2005), giving force 
to Fraser’s argument that maldistribution and malrecognition are not opposite, but entwined. Rather 
than reducing redistribution to a ‘merely cultural’ problem (Butler, 1997; Young, 1997), Fraser 
carefully claims that ‘misrecognition constitutes a fundamental injustice, whether accompanied by 
maldistribution or not’ (1997a: 281). She does not see the distinction between recognition and 
redistribution as clear-cut and insists that the antithesis between them is a myth (Fraser, 2003: 11, see 
also Fraser 2008). In doing so Fraser states that misrecognition is an issue because denying some 
individuals and groups status as partners in social interaction is a matter of justice and human rights 
(Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 29; Kompridis, 2013: 6) not simply because the distortion of relations to 
self is likely to impede human flourishing (Honneth, 1995).  
 
Treating happiness as a complex of relationally achieved feelings - rather than as a purely personal 
and independent experience - can illuminate how experiences of misrecognition unjustly misshape 
selves in social interaction. Political and economic inequality is consistently associated with low 
levels of well-being and life satisfaction across society, not simply among those who are directly 
negatively affected (Lane, 2000; Oishi and Kesebir, 2015). While inequality may not result in 
disadvantaged individuals feeling unhappy, it harms interactions and relations with others in ways that 
are unlikely to promote short-term mutual enjoyment and likely to foster background emotions of 
shared discontent and dissatisfaction. Economic inequality disrupts the mutual self-realisation 
described by Honneth and promotes individualised solutions to complex relational problems. 
Hochschild's (1983) The Managed Heart contains vivid evidence of this in relation to the unequal 
relations of contemporary capitalism. The emotional demands of work that aim to increase profit, 
oestensibly erode  opportunities for recognition, respect and kindness by limiting the authenticity of 
interactions with fellow workers, ‘customers’, clients, students or patients. Mutual unhappiness seems 
likely to result, but other feelings such as gratitude or anger (Hochschild, 1983) complicate matters, 
and feeling individually or mutually satisfied with life in an ongoing way remains highly dependent 
on the kinds of relations we can maintain with others (Finn, 2015). 
 
Happiness as a relational achievement linked to equality 
 
A relational approach to happiness builds on Honneth and Fraser’s contributions to an analysis of 
social inequalities by adding insights from sociological accounts of the injuries of class, race and 
gender (see for example Barbalet, 2001; Lamont, 2002; Lamont et al., 2016; Sennett and Cobb, 1971; 
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Skeggs, 1997; 2004). The first insight is that recognition is denied to socially/economically 
disadvantaged groups because of their disadvantaged position and this undermines their ability to 
enjoy happiness. Skeggs (1997; 2004) explains this in her work on the ‘emotional politics’ of class as 
a misrecognition of self as well as others via a disindentification of one’s own working class habitus 
and constant watchfulness of one’s embodiment lest it give away a devalued class location. However, 
this can underestimate the social knowledge of working class actors in the same ways as overly 
cognitive accounts of false consciousness (Barbalet, 2001: 64). How people understand and feel their 
social position in relation to others is key and this leads to  the second insight: that inequality 
structures injure recognition of those in similar social positions, including significant others. Skeggs’s 
identifies injuries as inflicted within relations to the self, not only by misrecognition from those of 
higher status. Lamont (2002) meanwhile attends to relations with other disadvantaged groups in the 
form of moral evaluations of the worth of self and one’s community in regard to others (see also 
Sayer, 2005). Her collaborative comparative research is novel in examining everyday experiences of 
stigmatization or ‘assault[s] on worth’, and in emphasizing how different cultural repertoires and 
contexts can inform resilience as a group, not individual, property. However, more attention to the 
emotional aspects of these experiences is needed (Lamont et al., 2016). Such attention is implicit in 
Sennett and Cobb's (1971) account of workers sacrificing wider recognition of their worth in the often 
misplaced expectation that their family members will feel grateful and respect them.. These accounts 
hint at a range of emotions from anxiety, to gratitude, to disgust, but the emotions tend not to be an 
explicit or substantial part of the analysis. Barbalet (2001) argues that class misrecognition and 
maldistribution (though he uses different terms) entail, not unhappiness, but the oppressed feeling 
resentful and the elites feeling fearful. Importantly he notes that class resentment is more about 
structural inequalities and that elite fear results more from feeling a relative loss of one's social power 
(Barbalet, 2001: 5-6). This distinction acknowledges that inequality and power are not the same thing, 
but they both speak to how relations to others are at once macro and micro in ways that complicate 
happiness as a social relational achievement. 
 
In examining happiness as a relational achievement we draw attention to how material disadvantage 
and lack of recognition combine in disrupting the ability of the disadvantaged to experience 
happiness. Examining complex ‘happy’ or ‘unhappy’ social relations, adds an assessment of 
emotional injuries to Fraser's context-specific appreciation of the status and material injuries resulting 
from misrecognition and maldistribution. For Fraser, the pursuit of happiness represents another form 
of identity politics overlooking the practical struggles of the less privileged. Certain people are more 
likely to have their relation to self and others distorted by ‘repeated encounters with the stigmatizing 
gaze of a culturally dominant other' (Fraser, 2000: 109).  Misrecognition is ‘a status injury' and also 
an ‘institutionalized social relation’, but the related injustices are conceived as material – including 
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some attention to them being instantiated in embodied habitus (Fraser, 1998: 143-4). The emotional 
injuries of misrecognition are not foregrounded. Fraser (1998: 3) says misrecognition: 
is not simply to be thought ill of, looked down on, or devalued in others’ conscious attitudes 
or mental beliefs. It is rather to be denied the status of a full partner in social interaction and 
prevented from participating as a peer in social life as a consequence of institutionalized 
patterns of cultural value that constitute one as comparatively unworthy of respect or esteem.  
An interactive account of the how misrecognition feels is lacking. The embodied and emotional 
‘damage’ done by misrecognition is alluded to by Iris Young (1991), but in terms of the ‘unconscious 
fears and aversions’ via which some types of bodies are despised as ugly and thus groups 
misrecognized. This implies that oppression is largely enacted through ‘negative’ feelings and 
reactions to marginalized social groups (Young, 1991: 124). Feelings remain the property of 
individuals rather than seeing emotions as produced through (unequal) social relations. They are felt 
by individuals, but also circulated and experienced in relation to others in  ways involving complexes 
of emotions (Burkitt, 2014). Thus, the socio-emotional context is important. The false opposition of 
recognition and redistribution only exists from a strictly macro perspective. 
 
Missrecognition and maldistribution combine, in interaction, to disrupt the experiencing of happiness, 
not simply for disadvantaged individuals but for particular social groups. Young (1991) theorizes 
injustice in terms of social groups and appreciates that identity is based on both political economy and 
culture. However, as Fraser (1997b) notes, Young’s conception of the social group is better suited to 
ethnic than class groups and thus less suited to explaining other socio-economic-emotional relations. 
Fraser writes that,  
some proponents of recognition, such as Iris Marion Young, insist that a difference-blind 
politics of redistribution can reinforce injustice by falsely universalising dominant group 
norms, requiring subordinate groups to assimilate to them, and misrecognizing the latter’s 
distinctiveness. (2003: 15) 
Fraser argues that redistribution ought to be the priority for dealing with inequalities experienced by 
exploited classes. Meanwhile, recognition is key to meeting the needs of disrespected genders and 
sexualities and both are needed to address the structural inequalities of gender and race. However, 
transformative approaches are necessary because redistribution seeks to overcome group differences, 
while recognition effectively promotes and even celebrates them. Such transformative approaches 
might require that the focus shifts to relations between groups and the imbrication of redistribution 
and recognition in making them ‘happier'. 
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However, some caution is required in assuming that redistribution and recognition will result in  more 
happiness for marginalised social groups. Equality is not a simple happy ending for all, it can produce 
a range of emotional consequences. Cas Wouters (2007) suggests that lessening status differences 
produce informalisation around emotion rules, requiring greater reflexivity. Such reflexivity can be 
anxiety inducing rather than joyful because of lack of clarity about what is supposed to make one 
happy. Yet Sara Ahmed (2010) argues that dominant cultural narratives of happiness do still dictate 
what should make people happy.  For Ahmed, cultural narratives of the good life play a role in 
(re)creating social inequalities. Happiness and the good life are not apolitical or unproblematic 
categories, but actively exclude the experiences, hopes and desires of minorities by normatively 
reinforcing ideal life narratives that are white, heterosexual and masculine. Consequently, collective 
knowledge of happiness is loaded with traditional demands, roles and expectations. Amongst many 
examples, Ahmed argues that seemingly harmless claims that the family is a continuous source of 
happiness, are loaded with assertions about gender, power and labour. She writes that we ‘are 
affirmed by happiness: we go along and get along by doing what we do, and doing it well. Happiness 
means here living a certain kind of life, one that reaches certain points, and which, in reaching these 
points, creates happiness for others’ (2010: 48). For example, in dominant narratives around 
happiness and femininity ‘[t]he happy housewife is a fantasy figure that erases the signs of labour 
under the sign of happiness’ (2010: 50), while the stereotype of the feminist killjoy discourages 
women from rejecting sexism. In exploring how living certain kinds of life ‘creates happiness for 
others’ Ahmed helps acknowledge that emotions not only result from lack of equality; dominant 
emotionologies imply certain kinds of relations and can reproduce inequalities. Notions of happiness 
and the good life are not detached from political questions of inequality, power and oppression, and 
by considering the specifically emotional aspects of socially experienced relations to others we can 
uncover often overlooked aspects of inequality and consider how to remedy them.  
 
If we consider happiness as a relational achievement we need to navigate between the idea that it is 
structurally determined by feeling rules that privilege dominant groups and the idea that it is open to 
emotional reflexivity. Happiness is not simply a matter of managing individual feelings in relation to 
cultural norms, it has to be worked at in the context of both interpersonal and structural relations 
between individuals and groups. In such considerations it is not enough to think about how power 
relations produce unhappiness. 
 
Happiness and other emotions can influence (Barbalet, 2001: 23), not just result from, changing group 
power and status relations. Theodore Kemper (1978) argues that emotions are a product of power 
relations, with ‘negative emotions' such as shame resulting from lacking power or status. 
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Nevertheless, Kemper's Weberian vision of power as individual power over others neglects how 
power produces certain kinds of people and things (Foucault 1990). He does not envision how 
emotions may contribute to discursive and material power processes that make embodied, feeling 
human beings in relation to others. Elias (1939/2001) has written convincingly of how historical shifts 
in power produced greater emotional regulation amongst groups trying to maintain their social 
position. He provides numerous examples of how this creates particular ways of being and feeling and 
sets of rules for relating to others of higher or lower status. Power relations may not simply produce 
emotions but be realised partly through the interactional doing of emotions, in ways that impact 
individuals, dyads and groups. In simple terms, as people do emotions they do power. If this is so, 
what kind of power relations does happiness do?   
 
In the relational doing of happiness, working towards more equality can be encouraged, although it 
does not inevitably emerge. Happy social actors often work at feeling good about and trusting 
significant and generalised others. They may not always do so, as unequal relations may be enjoyed. 
However, more consideration is needed of when and how the relational doing of happiness can 
produce more recognition and more material equality. Trusting and feeling good about others appears 
to require some recognition of those others as deserving of a share of the good life, as the evidence on 
happiness in more equal countries suggests. 
 
Narratives promoting the pursuit of happiness as an individual goal, need to be challenged by those 
advancing the pursuit of greater equality as a relational and emotional good. In examining happiness 
as relational we see it as part of a bundle of emotions, experienced in interaction and subject to 
misinterpretation. Thus, bringing recognition theory into conversation with an interactional and 
relational sociology of happiness can help examine the emotional causes and consequences of 
inequalities underexplored in Honneth and Fraser’s work. Emotions take place in relations to others; 
they may be felt by selves but are not solely interior, essential properties of individuals. Emotions 
happen in spaces between individuals and other agents – in interaction (Burkitt, 2012; 2014) – they 
are intersubjective but can be misinterpreted and thus produce decentered forms of intersubjectivity 
(Author, 2015)5. Sociologists should be aware of inaccuracies of self-reporting but focus more on 
theorizing how people's (often inaccurate) perceptions of what they and others feel informs their self 
and social understanding. 
 
To see happiness as relational, complex,  as an interactional achievement, increases our ability to 
explain how equality is linked to happiness, and to a range of other emotions. This furthers Honneth 
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and Fraser’s debates about recognition and redistribution as solutions to inequality. We eschew 
Utopian and other forms of thinking that view happiness in terms of emotional ‘resources’ or ‘capital’ 
(see for example Reay, 20046) that can or should be redistributed like material resources (Bauman, 
1976; More, 1869[1556]; Wright, 2010). The good of the many might involve some self-sacrifice, but 
happiness does not necessarily need to be deducted from the individual in order to add to group well-
being. Happiness is not a finite resource and emotions are not on a balance sheet that must tally. 
Economic inequality is not simply about some individuals having more than others, but about the 
shared social and emotional consequences of uneven distribution of material resources. Poverty 
produces bad outcomes for the poor and for society as a whole. Poorer individuals have poorer health 
and die earlier. Societies with high rates of poverty also have high rates of violence and crime, more 
people in prison and lower levels of educational performance. Countries with more even distributions 
of wealth tend to have fewer of these kinds of social problems (Kumanyika, 2012; Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2009). Some sociologists document the ‘unhappy' impacts of bad health, poor education, 
premature death of loved ones, being the victim of crime or of programmes of mass incarceration (see 
for example Bandes, 2009; Bendelow, 1993; Goffman, 2014; Gould, 2009; Reay, 2000; Skeggs, 
1997; Zembylas and Chubbuck, 2009). Yet misery and happiness arise from, and have the potential to 
damage or improve, collective as well as individual life (Bartram, 2012: 649-50). This does not mean 
that we can be deterministic about emotions as a consequence of material conditions because the 
agency of individuals is important. The conditions providing or diminishing individual agency are 
made clear by the recognition and redistribution debates. Moving from an individual to a relational 
view of happiness and associated emotions, means considering people’s everyday institutional 
interactions (Thin, 2012). Relational accounts of the complexity of happiness in social interactions 
can better help us understand how social inequalities undermine social wellbeing. What is less clear is 
how happiness might induce greater equality. Much of the happiness literature discussed suggests that 
being happy is linked to tolerance of others and dislike of inequality. If  happiness is thought of as a 
relational achievement, it appears to require some recognition and resourcing of others in order for 
that achievement to suceed. Relational happiness  requires interactively working at the pursuit of 
equality.  
Conclusion 
A relational approach to happiness reminds us that it is enjoyed intersubjectively. This is not a new 
insight, as Adam Smith (2006/1759: 3), for instance, describes how our happiness may depend on 
others: 
 How selﬁsh soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, 
which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. 
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However, it may be that other things are derived from, and contribute to, happiness. Greater social 
equality appears to increase happiness’, but measurement may encompass other emotions such as 
wellbeing, satisfaction, trust, envy, or shame. We contend that there is a complex of associated 
emotions around happiness, produced by the conditions of modernity but varying as power relations 
vary within contexts. Clarification is needed of how satisfaction and well-being relate to this complex 
and to currently configured social inequalities. Happiness’ has material and symbolic elements linking 
a variety of emotional experiences of interdependent persons to broader socio-emotional conditions. 
Social relations, not individual characteristics, are key to making sense of complex happiness and 
trust is but one important related emotion. Yet social relations change over time and cultures, altering 
how happiness and associated emotions are understood and practiced in line with social norms. 
Emotional states associated with happiness shape a sense of self, justice and social connectedness, as 
well as being shaped by them. The sociology of emotion has attended to the importance of trust, 
confidence, envy and shame in social life and social relations (Barbalet, 1996; Kemper, 1978; 
Patulny, 2015; Scheff, 2000), but without linking these to happiness and to misrecognition as 
reproducing inequalities. A relational approach to happiness as complex can contribute to re-
theorising inequality as both material and as reproduced through feelings about self and others. 
 
Selves are shaped in interaction and the intersubjective experience of happiness, wellbeing 
satisfaction, contentment and more is likely to be heavily determined by recognition, or lack of 
recognition of people's worth in relation to others. Lacking material resources does not inevitably 
make people unhappy, but is more likely to do so under current conditions of capitalism that can 
undermine the enjoyment of relations with others. By examining the emotional complex of happiness 
we can thus extend Fraser’s account of the connections between recognition and redistribution and 
consider emotional relations between embodied individuals and other agents as entangled within 
wider power relations (Burkitt, 2014). This demands further research on the complex individual and 
social experiencing of emotions akin to happiness. It also requires further consideration of the 
relationship between recognition/redistribution and happiness, that could draw further on existing 
sociological accounts of the injuries of class and other inequalities (Barbalet, 2001; Lamont, 2002; 
Sennett and Cobb, 1971; Skeggs, 1997, 2004). Analysis of happiness may benefit from exploration of 
other theoretical perspectives such as feminist intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 2006). 
These are directions for the future but what we offer here is also significant. 
 
If redistribution and recognition are intertwined, as Fraser argues, we can see happiness as a complex 
relational achievement making and made by inequalities. Redistribution/recognition might mean a 
different assignment of material ‘goods’ and a remaking of relations to others. Happiness and other 
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emotions influence (Barbalet, 2001: 23), and not just result from, shifting status and power relations 
(Elias, 2000; Kemper, 1978). The emotional influences and outcomes of greater equality may not be 
individual happiness, but happiness studies suggest that greater shared wellbeing and ongoing 
contentment may result. In speaking to both recognition theory and a sociology of happiness, we add 
new dimensions to sociological understandings of inequality. We reveal the ‘unhappy’ consequences 
for all of society, of conditions favouring maldistribution and misrecognition. Relations make us feel 
and feelings can remake relations. To see happiness as complex takes Honneth and Fraser’s debates 
about recognition and redistribution into new territory where we can recognize that a happy, content, 
good, satisfying life is an interactional achievement. 
Endnotes 
 
1  This definition draws on Barnwell's (2017) article on ‘Durkheim as Affect Theorist', which derives from him 
a more sociological view of affect, making less of the distinction from emotion and not seeing affect as 
pre or asocial. Instead, Durkheim helps us reads affect as collective and social and yet as encompassing 
thinking, feeling humans as well as non-human agents.  
 
2  The sequestering of the rich in gated communities is one instance of social inequalities limiting 
freedom of movement of the rich (Turner 2007). 
3  This relation may occur through interaction with particular ‘rich’ others in shared physical or virtual 
space, or be an imagined relation to a generalised rich other. 
4  However, Fraser argues that recognition remains under the banner of ethics in Honneth and Taylor’s 
work, even when misrecognition forms the basis of a denial of selfhood. She maintains that ‘both these 
theorists construe misrecognition in terms of impaired subjectivity and damaged self-identity. And both 
understand the injury in ethical terms, as stunting the subject’s capacity for achieving a good life. For 
Taylor and Honneth, therefore, recognition is an issue of ethics. Unlike Taylor and Honneth, I propose 
to conceive recognition as an issue of justice’ (Fraser 2001: 26). 
5  Some readings of Symbolic Interactionism (SI) suggest that people have accurate knowledge of 
emotions they are experiencing (Author, 2015), but we use SI approaches that see emotional 
experience as not transparent, as unpredictably produced and reproduced in interaction (hence the need 
for reflexivity) (Archer, 2000; Burkitt, 2012; Author, 2010). Hochschild has much to offer but her 
emphasis on ‘a self we define as real’ (1983: 183), which has authentic emotions, sits awkwardly with 
Meadian insistence on multiple selves (Mead, 1962: 142). Symbolic Interactionists do not necessarily 
care whether individuals authentically, accurately understand or report their emotions, if those 
understandings are real in their consequences (Holdsworth and Morgan, 2007; Author, 2010). 
6  The term ‘emotional capital’ has value in describing how emotional resources are inherited and can be 
exchanged for other forms of capital, but this tends to see emotional resources as belonging to 
individuals, whereas we theorise emotions as occurring in the relations between individuals and thus as 
more of a collective achievement. 
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